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SOME FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING
'From very early days down to the present time the essential
nature of trusts and other equitable interests has formed a
favorite subject for analysis and disputation. The classical dis-
cussions of Bacon' and Coke are familiar to all students of equity,
and the famous definition of the great chief justice (however
inadequate it may really be) is quoted even in the latest text-
books on trusts.2  That the subject has had a peculiar fascina-
tion for modern legal thinkers is abundantly evidenced by the
well known articles of Langdell s and Ames,
4 by the oft-repeated
I Bacon on Uses (Circa 1602; Rowe's ed. 1806), pp. 5-6: "The nature
of an use is best discerned by considering what it is not, and then what
it is. * * * First, an use is no right, title, or interest in law; and therefore
master attorney, who read upon this statute, said well, that there are but
two rights: hus in re: Jus ad rein.
"The one is an estate, which is jus in re; the other a demand, which
is jus ad reins but an use is neither. * * * So as now we are come by
negatives to the affirmative, what an use is. * * * Usus est dominium fidu-
ciarium: Use is an ownership in trust.
"So that usus & status, sive possessio, potius differunt secundun
rationern fori, quam secundum naturam rei, for that one of them is in
court of law, the other in court of conscience. * * *"
2,Co. Lit. (1628) 272 b: "Nora, an use is a trust or confidence reposed
in some other, which is not issuing out of the land, but as a thing collat-
erall, annexed in privitie to the estate of the land, and to the person touch-
ing the land, scilicet, that cesty que use shall take the profit, and that the
terre-tenant shall make an estate according to his direction. So as cesty
que use had neither jits in re, nor jus ad rein, but only a confidence and
trust for which he had no remedie by the common law, but for the breach
of trust, his remedie was only by subpoena in chancerie. * * *"
This definition is quoted and discussed approvingly in Lewin, Trusts
(12th ed., 1911), p. 11. It is also noticed in Maitland, Lectures on Equity
(1909), pp. 43, 116.
3 See Langdell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs (1900), 13 Harv.
L. Rev., 659, 673: "Can equity then create such rights as it finds to be
necessary for the purposes of justice? As equity wields only physical
power, it sems to be impossible that it should actual'y create anything. * * *
It seems, therefore, that equitable rights exist only in contemplation of
equity, i. e., that they are a fiction invented by equity for the promotion of
justice. * * *
"Shutting our eyes, then, to the fact that equitable rights are a fiction,
and assuming them to have an actual existence, what is their nature, what
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observations of Maitland in his Lectures on Equity,5 by the very
divergent treatment of Austin in his Lectures on Jurisprudence,'
by the still bolder thesis of Salmond "in his volume on Jurispru-
dence,7 and by the discordant utterances of "Mr. Hart8 and Mr.
their extent, and what is the field which they occupy? * * * They must not
violate the law. * * * Legal and equitable rights must, therefore, exist side
by side, and the latter cannot interfere with, or in any manner affect, the
former."
See also (1887) 1 Harv. L. Rev., 55, 60: "Upon the whole, it may be
said that equity could not create rights in ren if it would,, and that it
would not if it could." Compare Ibid. 58; and Summary of Eq. Plead.
(2nd ed., 1883) secs. 45, 182-184.
4 See Ames, "Purchase for Value Without Notice" (1887), 1 Harv.
L. Rev., 1, 9: "The trustee is the owner of the land, and, of course, two
persons with adverse interests cannot be owners of the same thing. What
the ccstui que trust really owns is the obligation of the trustee; for an
ob'igation is as truly the subject matter of property as any physical res.
The most striking difference between property in a thing aild property in
an obligation is in the mode of enjoyment. Tle owner of a house or a
horse enjoys the fruits of owneiship without the aid of any other person.
The only way in which the owner of an obligation can realize his owner-
ship is by compelling its performance by the obl'gor. Herce, in the one
case, the owner is said to have a right in ren, and in the other, a right in
pcrsonam. In other respects the common rules of property apply equally
to ownership of things and ownership of obligations. For example, what
may be called the passive rights of ownership are the same in both cases.
The general duty resting on all mankind not to destroy the property of
another, is as cogent in favor of an obligee as it is in favor of the owner
of a horse. And the violation of this duty is as pure a tort in the one
case as in the other."
5 Lect. on Eq. (1909), 17, 18, 112: "The thesis that I have to maintain
is this, that equitable estates and interests are not jura in rem. For
reasons that we shall perceive by and by, they have come to look very like
jura in rem; but just for this very reason it is the more necessary for us
to observe that they are essentially jura in personam, not rights againgt
the world at large, but rights against certain persons."
See also Maitland, Trust and Corporation (1904), reprinted in 3
Collected Papers, 321, 325.
6 (5th ed.) Vol. I, p. 378: "By the provisions of that part of the
English law which is called equity, a contract to sell at once vests jus in
rem or ownership in buyer, and the seller has only jus in re aliena. * * *
To complete the transaction the legal interest of the seller must be passed
to the buyer, in legal form. To this purpose the buyer has only jus in
personam: a right to compel the seller to pass his legal interest; but speak-
ing generally, he has dominium or jus in rem, and the instrument is a
conveyance."
7 (2nd ed., 1907) p. 230: "If we have regard to the essence of the
matter rather than to the form of it, a trustee is not an owner at all, but
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Whitlock9 in their very recent contributions to our periodical
literature.
It is believed that all of the discussions and analyses referred
to are inadequate. Perhaps, however, it would have to be
admitted that even the great intrinsic interest of the subject itself
and the noteworthy divergence of opinion existing among thought-
ful lawyers of all times would fail to afford more than a com-
paratively slight excuse for any further discussion considered as
a mere end in itself. But, quite apart from the presumably prac-
tical consideration of endeavoring to "think straight" in relation
to all legal problems, it is apparent that the true analysis of trusts
and other equitable interests is a matter that should appeal to
even the most extreme pragmatists of the law. It may well be
that one's view as to the correct analysis of such interests would
control the decision of a number of specific questions. This is
obviously true as regards the solution of many difficult and deli-
cate problems in constitutional law and in the conflict of laws.10
So, too, in certain questions in the law of perpetuities, the intrinsic
nature of equitable interests is of great significance, as attested
a mere agent, upon whom the law has conferred the power and imposed
he duty of administering the property of another person. In legal theory,
however, he is not a mere agent, but an owner. He is a person to whom
the property of someone else is fictitiously attributed by the law, to the
intent that the rights and powers thus rested in a nominal owner shall be
used by him on behalf of the real owner."
8 See Walter G. Hart (author of "Digest of Law of Trusts"), The
Place of Trust in Jurisprudence (1912), 28 Law Quart. Rev., 290, 296.
His position is substantially that of Ames and Maitland.
At the end of this article Sir Frederick Pollock, the editor, puts the
query: "Why is Trust not entitled to rank as a head sid generisf"
9 See A. N. Whitlock, Classification of the Law of Trusts (1913), 1
Calif. Law Rev., 215, 218: "It is submitted," says the writer, "that the
cesti has in fact something more than a right in personam, that such a
right might be more properly described as a right in personam ad ren,
or, possibly, a right in rem per personam."
Surely such nebulous and cumbrous expressions as these could hardly
fail to make "confusion worse confounded."
10 See Beale, Equitable Interests in Foreign Property, 20 Harv. L.
Rev. (1907), 382; and compare the important cases, Fall v. Eastin (1905),
75 Neb., 104; S. C. (1909), 215 U. S., 1, 14-15 (especially concurring
opinion of Holmes, J.) ; Selover, Bates &3r Co. v. Walsh (1912), 226 U. S.,
112; Bank of Africa Limited v. Cohen (1909), 2 Ch. 129, 143.
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by the well-known Gomm case' and others more or less similar.
The same thing is apt to be true of a number of special questions
relating to the subject of bona fide purchase for value. So on
indefinitely.
12
But all this may seem like misplaced emphasis; for the sug-
gestions last made are not peculiarly applicable to equitable in-
terests: the same points and the same examples seem valid in
relation to all possible kinds of jural interests, legal as well as
equitable,-and that too, whether we are concerned with "prop-
erty," "contracts," "torts," or any other title of the law. Special
reference has therefore been made to the subject of trusts and
other equitable interests only for the reason that the striking
divergence of opinion relating thereto conspicuously exemplifies
the need for dealing somewhat more intensively and systematically
than is usual with the nature and analysis of all types of jural
interests. Indeed, it would be virtually impossible to consider the
subject of trusts at all adequately without, at the very threshold
analyzing and discriminating the various fundamental conceptions
that are involved in practically every legal problem. In this
connection the suggestion may be ventured that the usual dis-
cussions of trusts and other jural interests seem inadequate (and
at times misleading) for the very reason that they are not
founded on a sufficiently comprehensive and discriminating
analysis of jural relations in general. Putting the matter in
another way, the tendency-and the fallacy-has been to treat
the specific problem as if it were far less complex than it really
is; and this commendable effort to treat as simple that which is
really complex has, it is believed, furnished a serious obstacle to
the clear understanding, the orderly statement, and the correct
solution of legal problems. In short, it is submmitted that the
11 (1882) 20 Ch. D. 562, 580, per Sir George Jessel, M. R.- "If then
the rule as to remoteness applies to a covenant of this nature, this cove-
nant clearly is bad as extending beyond the period allowed by the rule.
Whether the rule applies or not depends upon this, as it appears to me,
does or does not the covenant give an interest in the land? * * * If it is a
mere personal contract it cannot be enforced against the assignee. There-
fore the company must admit that somehow it binds the land. But if it
binds the land, it creates an equitable interest in the land."
12 Compare Ball v. Milliken (1910), 31 R. I., 36; 76 AtI., 789, 793, in-
volving a point other than perpetuities, but quoting in support of the de-
cision reached Sir George Jessel's language as to "equitable interests in
land." See preceding note.
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right kind of simplicity can result only from more searching and
more discriminating analysis.
If, therefore, the title of this article suggests a merely philo-
sophical inquiry as to the nature of law and legal relations,-a
discussion regarded more or less as an end in itself,-the writer
may be pardoned for repudiating such a connotation in advance.
On the contrary, in response to the invitation of the editor of this
journal, the main purpose of the writer is to emphasize certain
oft-neglected matters that may aid in the understanding and in
the solution of practical, every-day problems of the law. With
this end in view, the present article and another soon to follow
will discuss, as of chief concern, the basic conceptions of the
law,--the legal elements that enter into all types of jural interests.
A later article will deal specially with the analysis of certain
typical and important interests of a complex character,--more
particularly trusts and other equitable interests. In passing, it
seems necessary to state that both of these articles are intended
more for law school students than for any other class of readers.
For that reason, it is hoped that the more learned reader may
pardon certain parts of the discussion that might otherwise seem
unnecessarily elementary and detailed. On the other hand, the
limits of space inherent in a periodical article must furnish the
excuse for as great a brevity of treatment as is consistent with
clearness, and for a comparatively meager discussion-or even a
total neglect-of certain matters the intrinsic importance of which
might otherwise merit greater attention. In short, the emphasis
is to be placed on those points believed to have the greatest prac-
tical value.
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS CONTRASTED WITH NON-
LEGAL CONCEPTIONS.
At the very outset it seems necessary to emphasize the im-
portance of differentiating purely legal relations from the physical
and mental facts that call such relations into being. Obvious as.
this initial suggestion may seem to be, the arguments that one may
hear in court almost any day and likewise a considerable number
of judicial opinions afford ample evidence of the inveterate and
unfortunate tendency to confuse and blend the legal and the non-
legal quantities in a given problem. There are at least two
special reasons for this.
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For one thing, the association of ideas involved in the two sets
of relations-the physical and the mental on the one hand, and
the purely legal on the other-is in the very nature of the case,
extremely close. This fact has necessarily had a marked in-
fluence upon the general doctrines and the specific rules of early
sysitms of law. Thus, we are cold by Pollock and Maitland:
"Ancient German law, like ancient Roman law, sees great dif-
ficulties in the way of an assignment of a debt or other bznefit of
a contract * * * men do not see how there can be a transfer of a
right unless that right is embodied in some corporeal thing. The
history of the incorporeal things has shown us this; they are not
completely transferred until the transferee has obtained seisin.
has turned his beasts onto the pasture, presented a clerk to the
church or hanged a thief upon the gallows. A covenant or a
warranty of t;tlh may be so bound up with land that the assignee
of the land will be able to sue the covenantor or warrantor.'
'3
In another connection, the same learned authors observe:
"The realm of mediaval law is rich with incorporeal things.
Any permanent right which is of a transferable nature, at all
events if it has what we may call a territorial ambit, is thought of
as a thing that is very like a piece of land. Just because it is a
thing it is transferab!e. This is no fiction invented by the specu-
lative jurists. For the popular mind these things are things.
The lawyer's business is not to make them things but to point out
that they are incorporcal. The layman who wishes to convey
the advowson of a church will say that he conveys the church;
it is for Bracton to explain to him that what he means to transfer
is not that structure of wood and stone which belongs to God
and the saints, but a thitiz incorporeal, as incorporeal as his own
soul or the anima mundi."14
A second reason for the tendency to confuse or blend non-legal
and legal conceptions consists in the ambiguity and looseness of
our legal terminology. The word "property" furnishes a strik-
ing example. Both with lawyers and with laymen this term has
no definite or stable connotation. Sometimes it is employed to
indicate the physical object to which various legal rights, privi-
leges, etc., relate; then again-with far greater discrimination
and accuracy-the word is used to denote the legal interest (or
aggregate of legal relations) appertaining to such physical object.
Frequently there is a rapid and fallacious shift from the one
13 2 Hist. Eng. Law (2nd ed., 1905), 226.
24 Ibid., 124.
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meaning to the other. At times, also, the term is used in such
a "blended" sense as to convey no definite meaning whatever.
For the purpose of exemplifying the looser usage just referred
to, we may quote from Wilson v. Ward Lumber Co. :""
"The term 'property', as commonly used denotes any external
cbject over which the right of property is exercised. In this
sense it is a very wide term, and includes every class of acquisi-
tions which a man can own or have an interest in."
Perhaps the ablest statement to exemplify the opposite and
more accurate usage is that of Professor Jeremiah Smith (then
Mr. Justice Smith) in the leading case of Eaton v. B. C. & M.
R. R. Co. :16
"In a strict legal sense, land is not 'property', but the subject of
property. The term 'property', although in common parlance
frequently applied to a tract of land or a chattel, in its legal sig-
nification 'means only the rights of the owner in relation to it'.
'It denotes a right over a determinate thing'. 'Property is the
right of any person to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a thing'.
Selden, J., in Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y., 378, p. 433; 1
Blackstone's com., 138; 2 Austin's Jurisprudence, 3rd ed., 817,
818. * * * The right of indefinite user (or of using indefinitely)
is an essential quality of absolute property, without which abso-
lute property can have no existence. * * * This right of user
necessarily includes the right and power of excluding others from
using the land. See 2 Austin on Jurisbrudence, 3rd ed., 836;
Wells, J., in Walker v. 0. C. W. R. R., 103 Mass., 10, p. 14."
Another useful passage is to be found in the opinion of Sher-
wood, J., in St. Louis v. Hall :17
"Sometimes the term is applied to the thing itself, as a horse, or
a tract of land; these things, however, though the subjects of
"1 (1895) 67 Fed. Rep., 674, 677. For a somewhat similar, and even
more confusing, form of statement, see In re Fixeni (1900), 102 Fed. Rep.,
295, 296.
16 51 N. H., 504, 511. Se also the excellent similar statements of Con-
stock, J., in Wynehamer v. People (1856), 13 N. Y., 378, 396; Selden J.,
S. C., 13 N. Y., 378, 433-434; Ryan, C., in Law v. Rees Printing Co. (1894),
41 Neb., 127,. 146; Magruder, J., in Dixon v. People (1897), 168 Ill., 179,
190.
17 (1893) 116 Mo., 527, 533-534. That the last sentence- quoted is not
altogether adequate as an analysis of property will appear, it is hoped,
from the latter part of the present discussion.
See also, as regards the term, "property," the opinion of Doe, C. J.. in
Smith v. Fairloh (1894), 68 N. H., 123, 144-145. ("By considering the
property dissolved into the legal rights of which it consists" etc.)
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property, are, when coupled wi!h possession, but the indicia, the
visib'e manifestation of invisible rights, 'the evidence of things
not seen.'
"Property, then, in a determinate object, is composed of cer-
tain constituent elements, to wit: The unrestricted right of use,
enjoyment, and disposal, of that object."
In connection with the ambiguities latent in the term "prop-
erty", it seems well to observe that similar looseness of thought
and expression lurks in the supposed (but false) contrast between
"corporeal" and "incorporeal" property. The second passage
above quoted from Pollock and Maitland exhibits one phase of
this matter. For further striking illustration, reference may be
made to Blackstone's well-known discussion of corporeal and
incorporeal hereditaments. Thus, the great commentator tells
us:
"But an hereditament, says Sir Edward Coke, is by much the
largest and most comprehensive expression; for it includes not
only lands and tenements, but whatsoever may be inherited, be
it corporeal or incorporeal, real, personal, or mixed."',
It is clear that only legal interests as such can be inherited; yet
in the foregoing quotation there is inextricable confusion between
the physical or "corporeal" objects and the corresponding legal
interests, all of which latter must necessarily be "incorporeal," or
"invisible," to use the expression of Mr. Justice Sherwood. This
ambiguity of thought and language continues throughout Black-
stone's discussion; for a little later he says:
"Hereditaments, then, to use the largest expression, are of two
kinds, corporeal and incorporeal. Corporeal consist of such as
affect the senses, such as may be seen and handled by the body;
incorporeal are not the objects of sensation, can neither be seen
nor handled; are creatures of the mind, and exist only in con-
templation."
Still further on he says:
"An incorporeal hereditament is a right issuing out of a thing
corporate (whether real or personal), or concerning, or annexed
to, or exercisable within, the same. * * *
"Incorporeal hereditaments are principally of ten sorts: ad-
vowsons, tithes, commons, ways, offices, dignities, franchises,
corodies or pensions, annuities, and rents."
282 Black. Com. (1765), 16-43.
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Since all legal interests are "incorporeal"-consisting, as they
do, of more or less limited aggregates of abstract legal relations-
such a supposed contrast as that sought to be drawn by Black-
stone can but serve to mislead the unwary. The legal interest
of the fee simple owner of land and the comparatively limited
interest of the owner of a "right of way" over such land are alike
so far as "incorporeality" is concerned; the true contrast con-
sists, of course, primarily in the fact that the fee simple owner's
aggregate of legal relations is far more extensive than the aggre-
gate of the easement owner.
Much of the difficulty, as r~gards legal terminology, arises from
the fact that many of our words were originally applicable only
to physical things ;19 so that their use in connection with legal
relations is, strictly speaking, figurative or fictional. The term,
"transfer," is a good example. If X says that he has transferred
his watch to Y, he may conceivably meal, quite literally, that he
has physically handed over the watch to Y; or, more likely, that
he has "transferred" his legal interest, without any delivery of
possession,-the latter, of course, being a relatively figurative use
of the term. This point will be reached again, when we come to
treat of the "transfer" of legal interests. As another instance
of this essentially metaphorical use of a term borrowed from the
physical world, the word "power" may be mentioned. In legal
discourse, as in daily life, it may frequently be used in the sense
of physical or mental capacity to do a thing; but, more usually
and aptly, it is used to indicate a "legal power", the connotation
of which latter term is fundamentally different. The same ob-
servations apply, mutatis mutandis, to the term "liberty."
Passing to the field of contracts, we soon discover a similar
inveterate tendency to confuse and blur legal discussions by fail-
ing to discriminate between the mental and physical facts in-
volved in the so-called "agreement" of the parties, and the legal
"contractual obligation" to which those facts give rise. Such
19 Compare Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng. Law (2nd ed., 1905), Vol. II,
p. 31: "Few, if any, of the terms in our legal vocabulary have always been
technical terms. The license that the man of science can allow himself
of coining new words is one which by the nature of the case is denied to
lawyers. They have to take their terms out of the popular speech; grad-
ually the words so taken are defined; sometimes a word continues to have
both a technical meaning for lawyers and a different and vaguer meaning
for laymen; sometimes the word that lawyers have adopted is abandoned
by the laity." Compare also Ibid., p. 33.
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ambiguity and confusion are peculiarly incident to the use of the
term "contract." One moment the word may mean the agreement
of the parties; and then, with a rapid and unexpected shift, the
writer or speaker may use the term to indicate the contractual
obligation created by law as a result of the agrement. Further
instances of this sort of ambiguity will be noticed as the discus-
sion- proceeds.
OPERATIVE FACTS CONTRASTED WITH EVIDENTIAL
FACTS.
For the purpose of subsequent convenient reference, it seems
necessary at this point to lay emphasis upon another important
distinction inherent in the very nature of things. The facts
important in relation to a given jural transaction may be either
operative facts or evidential facts. Operative, constitutive,
causal, or "dispositive" facts are those which, under the general
legal rules that are applicable, suffice to change legal relations,
that is, either to create a new relation, or to extinguish an old
one, or to perform both of these functions simultaneously. 20 For
20 Compare Waldo, C. J., in White v. Multonomah Co. (1886), 13 Ore.,
317, 323: "A 'right' has been define dby Mr. Justice Holmes to be the legal
consequence which attaches to certain facts. (The Common Law, 214).
Every fact which forms one of the group of facts of which the right is
the legal consequence appertains to the substance of the right."
The present writer's choice of the term "operative" has been sug-
gested by the following passage from Thayer, Prelim. Treat. Evid. (1898),
p. 393: "Another discrimination to be observed is that between docu-
ments which constitute a contract, fact, or transaction, and those which
merely certify and evidence something outside of themselves,-a some-
thing valid and operative, independent of the writing."
Compare also Holland, Jurisp. (10th ed, 1906), 151: "A fact giving
rise to a right has long been described as a 'title'; but no such well-worn
equivalent can be found for a fact through which a right is transferred, or
for one by which a right is extinguished. A new nomenclature was
accordingly invented by Bentham, which is convenient for scientific use,
although it has not found its way into ordinary language. He describes
this whole class of facts as 'Dispositive'; distinguishing as 'Investitive'
those by means of which a right comes into existence, as 'Divestitive' those
through which it terminates, and as 'Translative' those through which it
passes from one person to another."
The word "ultimate," sometimes used in this connection, does not
seem to be so pointed and useful a term as either "operative" or "consti-
tutive." "
YALE LAW JOURNAL
example, in the creation of a contractual obligation between A
and B, the affirmative operative facts are, inter alia, that each of
the parties is a human being, that each of them has lived for not
less than a certain period of time, (is not "under age"), that A
has made an "offer," that B has "accepted" it, etc. It is some-
times necessary to consider, also, what may, from the particular
point of view, be regarded as negative operative facts. Thus,
e. g., the fact that A did not wilfully misrepresent an important
matter to B, and the fact that A had not "revoked" his offer,
must really be included as parts of the totality of operative facts
in the case already put.
Taking another example,-this time from the general field of
torts-if X commits an assault on Y by putting the latter in fear
of bodily harm, this particular group of facts immediately create
in Y the privilege of self-defense,--that is, the privilege of using
sufficient force to repel X's attack; or, correlatively, the other-
wise existing duty of Y to refrain from the application of force
to the person of X is, by virtue of the special operative facts,
immediately terminated or extinguished.
In passing, it may not be amiss to notice that the term, "facts
in issue," is sometimes used in the present connection. If, as
is usual, the term means "facts put in issue by the pleadings,"
the expression is an unfortuante one. The operative facts alleged
by the pleadings are more or less generic in character; and if
the pleadings be sufficient, only such generic operative facts are
"put in issue." The operative facts of real life are, on the other
hand, very specific. That being so, it is clear that the real and
specific facts finally relied on are comparatively seldom put in
issue by the pleadings. Thus, if, in an action of tort, the declar-
ation of A alleges that he was, through the carelessness, etc., of
B, bitten- by the latter's dog, the fact alleged is generic int char-
acter, and it matters not whether it was dog Jim or dog Dick that
did the biting. Even assuming, therefore, that the biting was
done by Jim, (rather than by Dick), -it could not be said that
this specific fact was put in issue by the pleadings. Similarly,
and more obviously, the pleading in an ordinary action involving
so-called negligence, is usually very generic in character, 21 so
21 Compare, however, Illinois Steel Co. v. Ostrowski (1902), 194 Ill.,
376, 384, correctly sustaining a declaration alleging the operative facts
specifically instead of generically, as required by the more approved forms
of pleading.
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that any one of various possible groups of specific operative facts
would suffice, so far as the defendant's obligation ex delicto is
concerned. It therefore could not be said that any one of such
groups had been put in issue by the pleadings. A common fal-
lacy in this connection is to regard the specific operative facts
established in a given case as being but "evidence" of the generic
(or "ultimate") operative facts alleged in the pleadings.2 2
An evidential fact is one which, on being ascertained, affords
some logical basis-not conclusive--for inferring some other fact.
The latter may be either a constitutive fact or an intermediate
evidential fact. Of all the facts to be ascertained by the tribunal,
the operative are, of course, of primary importance; the eviden-
tial are subsidiary in their functions.28  As a rule there is little
danger of confusing evidential facts with operative facts. But
there is one type of case that not infrequently gives rise to this
sort of error. Suppose that in January last a contractual obliga-
tion was created by written agreement passing between A and B.
In an action now pending between these parties, the physical
instrument is offered for inspection by the tribunal. If one were
thoughtless, he would be apt to say that this is a case where part
of the operative facts creating the original obligation are directly
presented to the senses of the tribunal. Yet a moment's reflec-
tion will show that such is not the case. The document, in its
The rules of pleading determining whether allegations must be generic
or specific-and if the latter, to what degree-are, like other rules of law,
based on considerations of policy and convenience. Thus the facts con-
stituting fraud are frequently required to be alleged in comparatively
specific form; and similarly as regards cruelty in an action for divorce
based on that ground. The reasons of policy are obvious in each case.
22 Compare McCaughey v. Schuette (1897), 117 Cal., 223. While the
decision in this case can be supported, the statement that the specific facts
pleaded were "evidentiary" seems inaccurate and misleading.
There are, of course, genuine instances of. the fatally erroneous plead-
ing of strictly evidential facts instead of either generic or specific opera-
tive facts. See Rogers v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis., 610; and contrast Illinois
Steel Co. v. Ostrowski, supra, note 21.
23 Both operative and evidential facts must, under the law, be ascer-
tained in some one or more of four possible modes: 1. By judicial admis-
sions (what is not disputed) ; 2. By judicial notice, or knowledge (what
is known or easily knowable) ; 3. By judicial perception (what is ascer-
tained directly through the senses; cf. "real evidence") ; 4. By judicial
inference (what is ascertained by reasoning from facts already ascertained
by one or more of the four methods here outlined).
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then existing shape, had, as regards its operative effect, spent its
force as soon as it was delivered in January last. If, therefore,
the unaltered document is produced for inspection, the facts thus
ascertained must, as regards the alleged contractual agreement, be
purely evidential in character. That is to say, the present exist-
ence of the piece of paper, its specific tenor, etc., may, along with
other evidential facts (relating to absence of change) tend to
prove the various operative facts of last January,--to wit, that
such paper existed at that time; that its tenor was then the same
as it now is; that it was delivered by A to B, and so forth.
It now remains to observe that in many situations a single con-
venient term is employed to designate (generically) certain mis-
cellaneous groups of operative facts which, though differing
widely as to their individual "ingredients," have, as regards a
given matter, the same -net force and effect. When employed
with discrimination, the term "possession" is a word of this char-
acter; so also the term "capacity," the term "domicile," etc. But
the general tendency to confuse legal and non-legal quantities is
manifest here as elsewhere; so that only too frequently these
words are used rather nebulously to indicate legal relations as
such.
24
FUNDAMENTAL JURAL RELATIONS CONTRASTED
WITH ONE ANOTHER.
One of the greatest hindrances to the clear understanding, the
incisive statement, and the true solution of legal problems fre-
quently arises from the express or tacit assumption that all legal
relations may be reduced to "rights" and "duties," and that these
latter categories are therefore adequate for the purpose of
analyzing even the most complex legal interests, such as trusts,
options, escrows, "future" interests, corporate interests, etc. Even
if the difficulty related merely to inadequacy and ambiguity of
24 As an example of this, compare Lord Westbury, in Bell v. Kennedy
(1868); L. R. 1 H. L. (Sc.), 307: "Domicile, therefore, is an idea of the
law. It is the relation-which the law creates between an individual and a
particular locality or country."
Contrast the far more accurate language of Chief Justice Shaw, in
Abington v. Bridgewater (1840), 23 Pick, 170: "The fact of domicile is
often one of the highest importance to a person; it determines his civil
and political rights and privileges, duties and obligations. * * *"
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terminology, its seriousness would nevertheless be worthy of
definite recognition and persistent effort toward improvement;
for in any closely reasoned problem, whether legal or non-legal,
chameleon-hued words are a peril both to clear thought and to
lucid expression.25  As a matter of fact, however, the above men-
tioned inadequacy and ambiguity of terms unfortunately reflect,
all too often, corresponding paucity and confusion as regards
actual legal conceptions. That this is so may appear in some
measure from the discussion to follow.
25In this connection, the words of one of the great masters of the
common law are significant. In his notable Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence (1898), p. 190, Professor James Bradley Thayer said:
"As our law develops it becomes more and more important to give*
definiteness to its phraseology; discriminations multiply, new situations
and complications of fact arise, and the old outfit of ideas, discriminations,
and phrases has to be carefully revised. Law is not so unlike all other
subjects of human contemplation that clearness of thought will not help
us powerfully in grasping it. If terms in common legal use are used
exactly, it is well to know it; if they are used inexactly, it is well to know
that, and to remark just how they are used."
Perhaps the most characteristic feature of this author's great con-
structive contribution to the law of evidence is his constant insistence on
the need for clarifying our legal terminology, and making careful "dis.
criminations" between conceptions and terms that are constantly being
treated as if they were one and the same. See, e.g., Ibid., pp. vii, 183,
189-190, 278, 306, 351, 355, 390-393. How great the influence of those
discriminations has been is well known to all students of the law of
evidence.
The comparatively recent remarks of Professor John Chipman Gray,
in his Nature and Sources of the Law (1909), Pref. p. viii, are also to the
point:
"The student of Jurisprudence is at times troubled by the thought that
be is dealing not with things, but with words, that he is busy with the
shape and size of counters in a game of logomachy, but when he fully
realizes how these words have been passed and are still being passed as
money, not only by fools and on fools, but by and on some of the acutest
minds, he feels that there is work worthy of being done, if only it can be
done worthily."
No less significant and suggestive is the recent and charactistic utter-
ance of one of the greatest jurists of our time, Mr. Justice Holmes. In
Hyde v. United States (1911), 225 U. S., 347, 391, the learned judge very
aptly remarked: "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become
encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further
analysis."
See also, Field, J., in Morgan v. Louisiana (1876), 93 U. S., 217, 223,
and Peckham. J. in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Tennessee (1895), 161 U. S., 174,
177, 178.
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The strictly fundamental legal relations are, after all, sui
generis; and thus it is that attempts at formal definition are
always unsatisfactory, if not altogether useless. Accordingly, the
most promising line of procedure seems to consist in exhibiting all
of the various relations in a scheme of "opposites" and "correla-
tives," and then proceeding to exemplify their individual scope
and application in concrete cases. An effort will be made to
pursue this method:
Jural rights privilege power immunity
Upposites no-rights duty disability liability
I Jural right privilege power immunity
Correlatives duty no-right liability disability
Rights and Duties. As already intimated, the term "rights"
tends to be used indiscriminately to cover what in a given case
may be a privilege, a power, or an immunity, rather than a right
in the strictest sense; and this looseness of usage is occasionally
recognized by the authorities. As said by Mr. Justice Strong in
People v. Dikeman :28
"The word 'right' is defined by lexicographers to denote, among
other things, property, interest, power, prerogative, immunity,
privilege (Walker's Dict. word 'Right'). In law it is most fre-
quently applied to property in its restricted sense, but it is often
used to designate power, prerogative, and privilege, * * *."
Recognition of this ambiguity is also found in the language of
Mr. Justice Jackson, in United States v. Patrick :21
"The words 'right' or 'privilege' have, of course, a variety of
meanings, according to the connection or context in which they
are used. Their definition, as given by standard lexicographers,
include 'that which one has a legal claim to do,' 'legal power,"
'authority, 'immunity granted by authority,' 'the investiture with
special or peculiar rights.'"
And, similarly, in the language of Mr. Justice Sneed, in Lonas-
v. State :28
"The state, then, is forbidden from making and enforcing any
law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States. It is said that the words rights, privileges-
and immunities, are abusively used, as if they were synonymous.
38 (1852) 7 How. Pr., 124, 130.
27 (1893) 54 Fed. Rep., 338, 348.
28 (1871) 3 Heisk. (Tenn.), 287, 306-307.
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The word riq'zts is generic, common, embracing whatever may be
lawfully claimed."
'29
It is interesting to observe, also, that a tendency toward dis-
crimination may be found in a number of important constitutional
and statutory provisions. Just how accurate the distinctions in
the mind of the draftsman may have been it is, of course, im-
possible to say.30
Recognizing, as we must, the very broad and indiscriminate
use of the term, -"right," what clue do we find, in ordinary legal
discourse, toward limiting the word in question to a definite and
appropriate meaning. That clue lies in the correlative "duty,"
for it is certain that even those who use the word and the con-
ception "right" in the broadest possible way are accustomed to
thinking of "duty" as the invariable correlative. As said in
Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Kurtz :31
29 See also, for similar judicial observations, Atchison & Neb. R.
Co. v. Baty (1877), 6 Neb., 37, 40. (The term right in civil society is de-
fined to mean that which a man is entitled to have, or to do, or to receive
from others within the limits prescribed by law.") ; San Francisco v. S. V.
Water Co. ( ), 48 Cal., 531 ("We are to ascertain the rights, privileges,
powers, duties and obligations of the Spring Valley Water Co., by refer-
ence to the general law.").
Compare also Gilbert, Evid. (4th ed., 1777), 126: "The men of one
county, city, hundred, town, corporation, or parish are evidence in relatio!,
to the rights privileges, immunities and affairs of such town, city, etc."
30 See Kearns v. Cordwainers' Co. (1859), 6 C. B. N. S., 388, 409 (con-
struing The Thames Conservancy Act, 1857, 20 and 21 Vict. c. cxlvii., s.
179: "None of the powers by this act conferred * * * shall extend to, take
away, alter or abridge any right, claim, privilege, franchise, exemption, or
immunity to which any owners * * * of any lands * * * are now by law
entitled."); Fearon v. Mitchell (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B., 690, 695 ("The other
question remains to be disposed of, as to whether the case comes within
the proviso of s. 50 of 21 and 22 Vict. c. 98, that 'no market shall be estab-
lished in pursuance of this section so as to interfere with any rights,
powers, or privileges enjoyed within the district by any person without his
consent.'"); Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 648a: "Building and loan associations
may be formed under this title with or without guarantee or other capital
stock, with all the rights, powers, and privileges, and subject -to all the
restrictions and liabilities set forth in this title.") ; Tenn. Const. of 1834,
Art. 9, sec. 7: "The legislature shall have no power to pass any law grant-
ing to any individual or individuals, rights, privileges and immunities or
exemptions, other than * * *").
31 (1894) 10 Ind. App., 60; 37 N. E., 303, 304.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
"A duty or a legal obligation is that which one ought or ought
not to do. 'Duty' and 'right' are correlative terms. When a
right is invaded, a duty is violated.
'3 2
In other words, if X has a right against Y that he shall stay
off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y
is under a duty toward X to stay off the place. If, as seems
desirable, we should seek a synonym for the term "right" in this
limited and proper meaning, perhaps the word "claim" would
prove the best. The latter has the advantage of being a mono-
syllable. In this connection, the language of Lord Watson in
Studd v. Cook3" is instructive:
"Any words which in a settlement of moveables would be
recognize I by the law of Scotland as sufficient to create a right
or claim in favor of an executor * * * must receive effect if used
with reference to lands in Scotland."
Privileges and "No-Rights." As indicated in the above scheme
of jural relations, a privilege is the opposite of a duty, and the
correlative of a "no-right." In the example last put, whereas X
has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the
land, he himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in
equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off. The
privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off. As
indicated by this case, some caution is necessary at this point,
for, always, when it is said that a given privilege is the mere
negation of a duty, what is meant, of course, is a duty having a
content or tenor precisely opposite to that of the privilege in
question. Thus, if, for some special reason, X has contracted
with Y to go on the former's own land, it is obvious that X has,
as regards Y, both the privilege of entering and the duty of enter-
ing. The privilege is perfectly consistent with this sort of duty,--
32 See also Howley Park Coal, etc., Co. v. L. & N. W. Ry. (1913),
A. C. 11, 25, 27 (per Viscount Haldane, L. C.: "There is an obligation (of
lateral support) on the neighbor, and in that sense there is a correlative
right on the part of the owner of the first piece of land ;" per Lord Shaw:
"There is a reciprocal right to lateral support for their respective lands and
a reciprocal obligation upon the part of each owner. * * * No diminution
of the right on the one hand or of the obligation on the other can be
effected except as the result of a plain contiact. * * *").
Compare, to similar effect, Galveston, etc. Ry. Co. v. Harrigan (1903),
76 S. W., 452, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.).
23 (1883) 8 App. Cas., at p. 597.
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for the latter is of the same content or tenor as the privilege ;-
but it still holds good that, as regards Y, X's privilege of entering
is the precise negation of a duty to stay off. Similarly, if A has
not contracted with B to perform certain work for the latter, A's
privilege of not doing so is the very negation of a duty of doing
so. Here again the duty contrasted is of a content or tenor
exactly opposite to that of the privilege.
Passing now to the question of "correlatives," it will be remem-
bered, of course, that a duty is the invariable correlative of that
legal relation which is most properly called a right or claim. That
being so, if further evidence be needed-as to the fundamental and
important difference between a right (or claim) and a privilege,
surely it is found in the fact that the correlative of the latter
relation is a "no-right," there being no single term available to
express the latter conception. Thus, the correlative of X's right
that Y shall not enter on the land is Y's duty not to enter; but
the correlative of X's privilege of entering himself is manifestly
Y's "no-right" that X shall not enter.
In view of the considerations thus far emphasized, the im-
portance of keeping the conception of a right (or claim) and the
conception of a privilege quite distinct from each other seems
evident; and more than that, it is equally clear that there should
be a separate term to represent the latter relation. No doubt, as
already indicated, it is very common to use the term "right" in-
discriminately, even when the relation designated is really that of
privilege ;34 and only too often this identity of terms has involved
for the particular speaker or writer a confusion or blurring of
ideas. Good instances of this may be found even in unexpected
places. Thus Professor Holland, in his work on Jurisprudence,
referring to a different and well known sort of ambiguity inherent
in the Latin "Ius," the German "Recht," the Italian "Diritto," and
the French "Droit,'"--terms used to express "not only 'a right,'
but also 'Law' in the abstract,"-very aptly observes:
"If the expression of widely different ideas by one and the
same term resulted only in the necessity for * * * clumsy para-
s4 For merely a few out of numberless judicial instances of this loose
usage, see Pearce v. Scotcher (1882), L. R. 9 Q. B., 162, 167; Quinn v.
Leathen (1901), A. C. 495 (passim); Allen v. Flood (1898), A. C. 1
(passim); Lindley v. Nat. Carbonic Acid Gas Co. (1910), 220 U. S., 61,
75; Smith v. Cornell Univ. (1894), 45 N. Y. Supp., 640, 643; Farnum v.
Kern Valley Bk. (1910), 107 Pac., 568. See also post, n. 38.
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phrases, or obviously inaccurate paraphrases, no great harm would
be dne; but unfortunately the identity of terms seems irresist-
ibly to suggest an identity between the ideas expressed by them."
5
Curiously enough, however, in the very chapter where this
appears,--the chapter on "Rights,"--the notions of right, privi-
lege and power seem to be blended, and that, too, although the
learned author states that "the correlative of * * * legal right is
legal duty," and that "these pairs of terms express * * * in each
case the same state of facts viewed from opposite sides." While the
whole chapter must be read in order to appreciate the seriousness
of this lack of discrimination a single passage must suffice by way
of example:
"If * * * the power of the State will protect him in so carrying
out his wishes, and will compel such acts or forbearances on the
part of other people as may be necessary in order that his wishes
may be so carried out, then he has a 'legal right' so to carry out
his wishes."3 6
The first part of this passage suggests privileges, the middle
part rights (or claims), and the last part privileges.
Similar difficulties seem to exist in Professor Gray's able and
entertaining work on The Nature and Sources of Law. In his
chapter on "Legal Rights and Duties" the distinguished author
takes the position that a right always has a duty as its correla-
tive ;17 and he seems to define the former relation substantially
according to the more limited meaning of "claim." Legal privi-
leges, powers, and immunities are prima facie ignored, and the
impression conveyed that all legal relations can be comprehended
under the conceptions, "right" and "duty." But, with the great-
est hesitation and deference, the suggestion may be ventured that
a number of his examples seem to show the inadequacy of such
mode of treatment. Thus, e. g., he says:
"The eating of shrimp salad is an interest of mine, and, if I can
pay for it, the law will protect that interest, and it is therefore a
right of mine to eat shrimp salad which I have paid for, although
I know that shrimp salad always gives me the colic."38
This passage seems to suggest primarily two classes of rela-
tions: first, the party's respective privileges, as against A, B, C.
85 El. Jurisp. (10th ed.), 83.
86 Ibid., 82.
3 See Nat. and Sources of Law (1909), secs. 45, 184.
38 Ibid., sec. 48.
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D and others in relation to eating the salad, or, correlatively, the
respective "no-rights" of A. B. C. D and others that the party
should not eat the salad; second, the party's respective rights (or
claims) as against A. B. C. D and others that they should not
interfere with the physical act of eating the salad, or, correla-
tively, the respective duties of A, B, C, D and others that they
should not interfere.
These two groups of relations seem perfectly distindt; and the
privileges could, in a given case exist even though the rights men-
tioned did not. A. B. C. and D, being the owners of the salad,
might say to X: "Eat the salad, if you can; you have our license
to do so, but we don't agree not to interfere with you." In such
a case the privileges exist, so that if X succeeds in eating the
salad, he has violated no rights of any of the parties. But it is
equally clear that if A had succeeded in holding so fast to the
dish that X couldn't eat the contents, no right of X would have
been violated.39
Perhaps the essential character and importance of the distinc-
tion can be shown by a slight variation of the facts. Suppose
that X, being already the legal owner of the salad, contracts with
Y that he (X) will never eat this particular food. With A, B,
39 Other instances in Professor Gray's work may be noted. In sec.
53, he says: "So again, a householder has the right to eject by force a
trespasser from his 'castle.' That is, if sued by the trespasser for an
assault, he can call upon the court to refuse the plaintiff its help. In other
words, a man's legal rights include not only the power effectually to call
for aid from an organized society against another, but also the power to
call effectually upon the society to abstain from aiding others."
This, it is respectfully submitted, seems to confuse the householder's
privilege of ejecting the trespasser (and the "no-right" of the latter) with
a complex of potential rights, privileges, powers and immunities relating
to the supposed action at law.
In sec. 102, the same learned author says: "If there is an ordinance
that the town constable may kill all dogs without collars, the constable
may have a legal right to kill such dogs, but the dogs are not under a legal
duty to wear collars."
It would seem, however, that what the ordinance did was to create a
privilege-the absence of the duty not to kill which otherwise would have
existed in favor of the owner of the dog. Moreover. that appears to be
the most natural connotation of the passage. The latter doesn't except
very remotely, call up the idea of the constable's accompanying rights
against all others that they shouldn't interfere with his actual killing of
the dog.
See, also, secs. 145. 186.
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C, D and others no such contract has been made. One of the
relations now existing between X and Y is, as a consequence,
fundamentally different from the relation between X and A. As
regards Y, X has no privilege of eating the salad; but as regards
either A or any of the others, X has such a privilege. It is to
be observed incidentally that X's right that Y should not eat the
food persists even though X's own privilege of doing so has been
extinguished.
4 0
On grounds already emphasized, it would seem that the line of
reasoning pursued by Lord tindley in the great case of Quinn v.
Leathemn 1 is deserving of comment:
"The plaintiff had the ordinary rights of the British subject.
He was at liberty to earn his living in his own way, provided he
did not violate some special law prohibiting him from so doing,
and provided he did not infringe the rights of other pople. This
liberty involved the liberty to deal with other persons who were
willing to deal with him. This liberty is a right recognized by
law; its correlative is the general duty of every one not to prevent
the free exercise of this liberty except so far as his own liberty of
action may justify him in so doing. But a person's liberty or
right to deal with others is nugatory unless they are at liberty to
deal with him if they choose to do so. Any interference with
their liberty to deal with him affects him."
A "liberty" considered as a legal relation (or "right" in the
loose and generic sense of that term) must mean, if it have any
definite content at all, precisely the same thing as privilege,4 2 and
certainly that is the fair connotation of the term as used the first
three times in the passage quoted. It is equally clear, as already
indicated, that such a privilege or liberty to deal with others at
will might very conceivably exist without any peculiar con-
comitant rights against "third parties" as regards certain kinds of
interference.4 3 Whether there should be such concomitant rights
(or claims) is ultimately a question of justice and policy; and it
should be considered, as such, on its merits. The only correlative
logically implied by the privileges or liberties in question are the
"no-rights" of "third parties." It would therefore be a non
40 It may be noted incidentally that a statute depriving a party of
privileges as such may raise serious constitutional questions under the
Fourteenth Amendmefit. Compare, e. g., Lindley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co.
(1910), 220 U. S., 61.
41 (1901) A. C., 495, 534.
42 See post, pp. 38-44.
4 Compare Allen v. Flood (1898), A. C., 1.
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sequitur to conclude from the mere existence of such liberties that
"third parties." are under a duty not to interfere, etc. Yet in
the middle of the above passage from Lord Lindley's opinion
there is a sudden and question-begging shift in the use of terms.
First, the "liberty" in question is transmuted into a "right," and
then, possibly under the seductive influence of the latter word, it
is assumed that the "correlative" must be "the general duty of
every one not to prevent," etc.
Another interesting and instructive example may be taken from
Lord Bowen's oft-quoted opinion in Mogul Steamship Co. v.
McGregor.
44
"We are presented in this case with an apparent conflict or
antinomy between two rights that are equally regarded by the
law-the right of the plaintiffs to be protected in the legitimate
exercise of their trade, and the right of the defendants to carry
on their business as seems best to them, provided they commit no
wrong to others."
As the learned judge states, the conflict or antinomy is only
apparent; but this fact seems to be obscured by the very in-
definite and rapidly shifting meanings with which the term "right"
is used in the above quoted language. Construing the passage as
a whole, it seems plain enough that by "the right of the plain-
tiffs" in relation to the defendants a legal right or claim in the
strict sense must be meant; whereas by "the right of the de-
fendants" in relation to the plaintiffs a legal privilege must be
intended.. That being so, the "two rights" mentioned in the
beginning of the passage, being respectively claim and privilege,
could not be in conflict with each other. To the extent that the
defendants have privileges the plaintiffs have no rights; and con-
versely, to the extent that the plaintiffs have rights the defendants
have no privileges ("no-privilege" equals duty of opposite
tenor) .45
44 (1889) 23 Q. B. D., 59.
45 Cases almost without number might be cited to exemplify similar
blending of fundamental conceptions and rapid shifting in the use of
terms ;-and that, too, even when the problems itvolved have been such
as to invite close and careful reasoning. For a few important cases of
this character, see Allen v. Flood (1898), A. C, 1, (Hawkins. J., p. 16: "I
know it may be asked, 'What is the legal right of the plaintiffs which is
said to have been invaded?' My answer is, that right which should never be
lost sight of, and which I have already stated-the right freely to pursue
their lawful calling;" Lord Halsbury, p. 84: "To dig into one's own land
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Thus far it has been assumed that the term "privilege" is the
most appropriate and satisfactory to designate the mere negation
of duty. Is there good warrant for this?
In Mackeldey's Roman Law40 it is said:
"Positive laws either contain general principles embodied in
the rules of law * * * or for especial reasons they estab'ish some-
tl-ing that differs from those general principles. In the first case
they contain a common law (jus commune), in the second a
special law (jus singulare s. exorbitans). The latter is either
favorable or unfavorable * * * according as it enlarges or re-
str:cts, in cpposition to the common rule, the rights of those for
whom it is established. The favorable special law (jus singulare)
as also the right created by it * * * in the Roman law is termed
benefit of the law (beneficium juris) or privilege (privilegium)
** *"47
First a special law, and then by association of ideas, a special
advantage conferred by such a law. With such antecedents, it
is not surprising that the English word "privilege" is not infre-
quently used, even at the present time, in the sense of a special or
peculiar legal advantage (whether right, privilege, power or im-
munity) belonging either to some individual or to some particular
class of persons.4 8 There are, indeed, a number of judicial opinions
under the circumstances stated requires no cause or excuse. He may act
from mere caprice, but his right on his own land is absolute, so long as
he does not interfere with the rights of others;" Lord Ashbourne, p. 112:
"The plaintiff had, in my opinion, a clear right to pursue their lawful call-
ing. • * * It would be, I think, an unsatisfactory state of the law that
allowed the wilful invader of such a right without lawful leave or justifica-
tion to escape from the consequences of his action."); Quinn v. Leathern
(1901), A. C., 495, 533; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co (1910), 220
U. S., 61, 74; Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. (1902), 171 N. Y.,
538 (Parker, C. J., p. 544: "The so-called right of privacy is, as the phrase
suggests, founded upon the claim that a man has the right to pass through
this world, if he wills, without having his picture published."); Wabash,
St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Shacklet (1883), 105 Ill., 364, 389.
In Purdy v. State (1901), 43 Fla., 538, 540, the anomalous expression
"right of privilege" is employed.
46 (Dropsie Tr.) secs. 196-197.
47The same matter is put somewhat less clearly in Sohm's Institutes
(Ledlies Tr., 3rd ed.), 28.
See also Rector, etc. of Christ Church v. Philadelphia (1860), 24
How., 300, 301, 302.
48 According to an older usage, the term "privilege" was frequently
employed to indicate a "franchise." the latter being really a miscellaneous
complex of special rights, privileges, powers, or immunities. etc. Thus, in
an early book, Termes de la Ley, there is the following definition: "'Privi-
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recognizing this as one of the meanings of the term in question.4 9
That the. word has a wider signification even in ordinary non-
technical usage is sufficiently indicated, however, by the fact that
the term "special privileges" is so often used to indicate a contrast
to ordinary or general privileges. More than this, the dominant
specific connotation of the term as used in popular speech seems
to be more negation of duty. This is manifest in the terse and
oft-repeated expression, "That is your privilege,"-meaning, of
course, "You are under no duty to do otherwise."
Such being the case, it is not surprising to find, from a wide
survey of judicial precedents, that the dominant technical mean-
ing of the term is, similarly, negation of legal duty.r0 There are
two very common examples of this, relating respectively to "priv-
ileged communications" in the law of libel and to "privileges
against self-crimination" in the law of evidence. As regards the
first case, it is elementary that if a certain group of operative facts
are present, a privilege exists, which, without such facts, would
not be recognized.," It is, of course, equally clear that even
leges' are liberties and franchises granted to an office, place, towne, or
manor by the King's great charter, letters patent, or Act of Parliament, as
toll, sake, socke, infangstheefe, outfangstheefe, turne, or delfe, and divers
such like."
Compare Blades v Higgs (1865), 11 H. L. Cas., 621, 631, per Lord
Westbury: "Property ratione privilegii is the right which by a peculiar
franchise anciently granted by the Crown, by virtue of prerogative, one
may have of taking animals ferae naturae on the land of another; and in
like manner the game when taken by virtue of the privilege becomes the
absolute property of the owner of the franchise."
49 See Humphrey v. Pequcs (1872), 16 Wall., 244, 247, per Hunt, J.:
"All the 'privileges' as well as powers and rights of the prior company.
were granted to the latter. A more imporant or more comprehensive
privilege than a perpetual immunity from taxation can scarcely be imag-
ined. It contains the essential idea of a peculiar benefit or advantage, of
a special exemption from a burden falling upon others."
See also Smith v. Floyd (1893), 140 N. Y., 337, 342; Lonas v. State
(1871). 3 Heisk., 287, 306,307; Territory v Stokes (1881), 2 N. M., 161,
169, 170; Ripley v. Knight (1878), 123 Mass., 515, 519; Dike v. State
(1888), 38 Minn., 366; Re Miller (1893), 1 Q. B., 327.
Compare Wisener v. Burrell (1911), 28 Okla., 546.
o Compare Louisville & N. R Co. v. Gaines (1880), 3 Fed. Rep., 266,
278, per Baxter, Asso. J.: "Paschal says (the term privilege) is a special
right belonging to an individual or class; properly, an exemption from
some duty."
51 For apt use of the terms, "privilege" and "privileged" in relation to
libel, see Hawkins, J., in Allen v. Flood (1898), A. C. 1, 20-21.
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though all such facts be present as last supposed, the superadded
fact of malice will, in cases of so-called "conditional privilege,"
extinguish the privilege that otherwise would exist. It must be
evident also, that whenever the privilege does exist, it is not
special in the sense of arising from a special law, or of being con-
ferred as a special favor on a particular individual. The same.
privilege would exist, by virtue of general rules, for any person
whatever under similar circumstances. So, also, in the law of
evidence, the privilege against self-crimination signifies the mere
negation of a duty, to testify,-a duty which rests upon a witness
in relation to all ordinary matters; and, quite obviously, such
privilege arises, if at all, only by virtue of general laws.
5 2
As already intimated, while both the conception and the term
"privilege" find conspicuous exemplification under the law of
libel and the law of evidence, they nevertheless have a much
wider significance and utility as a matter of judicial usage. To
make this clear, a few miscellaneous judicial precedents will now
be noticed. In Dowman's Case,53 decided in the year 1583, and
reported by Coke, the court applied the term to the subject of
waste:
"And as to the objection which was made, that the said privi-
lege to be without impeaclment of waste cannot be without deed,
etc. To that it was answered and resolved, that if it was admitted
that a deed in such case should be requisite, yet without question
all the estates limited would be good , although it is admitted,
that the clause concerning the said privilege would be void."
In the great case of Allen v. Flood 4 the opinion of Mr. Justice
Hawkins furnishes a useful passage for the purpose now in view:
52 As regards the general duty to testify, specific performance may
usually be had under duress of potential or actual contempt proceedings;
and, apart from that, failure to testify might subject the wrongdoer either
to a statutory liability for a penalty in favor of the injured party litigant or,
in case of actual damage, to a common law action on the case.
The subject of witnesses is usually thought of as a branch of the so-
called adjective law, as distinguished, from the so-called substantive law.
But, as the writer has had occasion to emphasize on another occasion (TI-e
Relations betwen Equity and Law, 11 Mich. L. Rev., 537, 554, 556, 569),
there seems to be no intrinsic or essential difference between those jural
relations that relate to the "substantive" law and those that relate to the
"adjective" law. This matter will be considered more fully in a later
part of the discussion.
53 (1583) 9 Coke, 1.
54 (1898) A. C., 1, 19.
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"Every person has a privi'ege * * * in the interests of public
justice to put the criminal law in motion against another whom
l.e bona fide, and upon reasonable and probable cause, believes to
1ave been guilty of a crime. * * * It must not, however, be sup-
posed that hatred and ill-will existing in the mind of a prosecutor
must of necessity destroy the privilege, fof it is not impossible
that such hatred and ill-will may have very natural ana pardon-
able reasons for existing. * * *"
Applying the term in relation to the subject of property, Mr.
Justice Foster, of the Supreme Court of Maine, said in the case
of Pulitzer v. Luingston :"
"It is contrary to the policy of the law that there should be
any outstanding titles, estates, or powers, by the existence, opera-
tion or exercise of which, at a period of time beyond lives in being
and twenty-one years and a fraction thereafter, the complete and
unfettered enjoyment of an estate, with all the rights, privileges
and bowers incident to ownership, should be qualified or im-
peded."
As a final example in the present connection, the language of
Baron Alderson in Hilton v. Eckerley"0 may be noticed:
"Prima facie it is the privilege of a trader in a free country, in
111 matters not contrary to law, to regulate his own mode of
carrying them on according to his discretion and choice.' 7
The closest synonym of legal "privilege" seems to be legal
"liberty." This is sufficiently indicated by an unusually discrim-
inating and instructive passage in Mr. Justice Cave's opinion in
Allen v. Flood :',
"The personal rights with which we are most familiar are:
1. Rights of reputation; 2. Rights of bodily safety and freedom;
3. Rights of property; or, in other words, rights relating to
mind, body and estate, * * *
"In my subsequent remarks the word 'right' will, as far as
possible, always be used in the above sense; and it is the more
5 (1896) 89 Me., 359.
56 (1856) 6 E. & B., 47. 74.
57 For other examples of apt use of the term in question, see Borland
v Boston (1882), 132 Mass., 89 ("municipal rights, privileges, powers or
duties"); Hamilton v. Graham (1871), L. R. 2 H. L. (Sc.), 167, 169, per
Hatherley, L. C.; Jones v. De Moss (1911), 151 Ia., 112, 117; Kripp v.
Curtis (1886), 71 Cal., 62, 63; Lamer v. Booth (1874), 50 Miss., 411, 413:
Weller v. Brown (1911), Cal., ; 117 Pac., 517; Mathews v. People
(1903), 202 Ill.. 389, 401; Abington v. North Bridgewater (1840), 23 Pick.,
170.
58 (1898) A. C., 1, 29.
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necessary to insist on this as during the argument at your Lord-
ship's bar it was frequently used in a much wider and more in-
definite sense. 'Ihus it was said that a man has a perfect right
to fire off a gun, when all that was meant, apparently, was that a
man has a freedom or liberty to fire off a gun, so long as he does
not violate or infringe any one's rights in doing so, which is a
very different thing from a right, the violation or disturbance of
which can be remedied or prevented by legal process."
59
While there are numerous other instances of the apt use of the
term "liberty," both in judicial opinions
60 and in conveyancing
59 For the reference to Mr. Justice Cave's opinion, the present writer
is indebted to Salmond's work on Jurisprudence. Citing this case and one
other, Starey v. Graham (1899), 1 Q. B., 406, 411, the learned author adopts
and uses exclusively the term "liberty" to, indicate the opposite of "duty,"
and apparently overlooks the importance of privilege in the present con-
nection. Curiously enough, moreover, in his separate Treatise on Torts,
his discussion of the law of defamation gives no explicit intimation that
privilege in relation to that subject represents merely liberty, or "no-duty."
Sir Frederick Pollock, in his volume on jurisprudence (2nd ed., 1904),
62, seems in effect to deny that legal liberty represents any true legal rela-
tion as such. Thus, he says, inter alia: "The act may be right in the
popular and rudimentary sense of not being forbidden, but freedom has
not the character of legal right until we consider the risk of unauthorized
interference. It is the duty of all of us not to interfere with our neigh-
bors' lawful freedom. This brings the so-called primitive rights into the
sphere of legal rule and protection. Sometimes it is thought that lawful
power or liberty is different from the right not to be interfered with; but
for the reason just given this opinion, though plausible, does not seem
correct." Compare also Pollock, Essays in Jurisp. & Ethics (1882), Ch. I.
It is difficult to see, however, why, as between X and Y, the "privilege +
no-right" situation is not just as real a jural relation as the precisely op-
posite "duty + right" relation betwen any two parties. Perhaps the habit
of recognizing exclusively the latter as a jural relation springs more or
less from the traditional tendency to think of the law as consisting of
"commands," or imperative rules. This, however, seems fallacious. A
rule of law that permits is just as real as a rule of law that forbids; and,
similarly,s aying that the law permits a given act to X as between himself
and Y predicates just as genuine a legal relation as saying that the law
forbids a certain act to X as between himself and Y. That this is so
seems, in some measure, to be confirmed by the fact that the first sort of
act would ordinarily be pronounced "lawful," and the second "unlawful."
Compare Thomas v. Sorrel (1673), Vaughan, 331, 351.
60 Compare Dow v. Newborough (1728), Comyns, 242 ("For the use is
only a liberty to take the profits, but two cannot severally take the profits
of the same land, therefore there cannot be an use upon a use." It should
be observed that in this and the next case to be cited, along with the liberty
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documents,"' it is by no means so common or definite a word as
"privilege." The former term is far more likely to be used in
the sense of physical or personal freedom (i. e., absence of physi-
cal restraint), as distinguished from a legal relation; and very
frequently there is the connotation of general political liberty, as
distinguished from a particular relation between two definite indi-
viduals. Besides all this, the term "privilege" has the advantage
of giving us, as a variable, the adjective "privileged". Thus, it
is frequently convenient to speak of a privileged act, a privileged
transaction, a privileged conveyance, etc.
The term "license", sometimes used as if it were synonymous
with "privilege," is not strictly appropriate. This is simply an-
other of those innumerable cases in which the mental and physical
facts are so frequently confused with the legal relation which
or privilege there are associated powers and rights, etc.: for instance, the
power to acquire a title to the things severed from the realty) ; Bourne v.
Taylor (1808), 10 East., 189 (Ellenborough, C. J.) : "The second questic
is whether the replication ought to have traversed the liberty of working
the mines. * * * The word liberty, too, implies the same thing. It im-
ports, ex vi termini, that it is a privilege to be exercised over another man's
estates"); Wickham v. Hawkes (1840), 7 M. & W., 63, 78-79; Quinn v.
Leathen (1901), A. C. 495, 534 (per Lord Lindley: see quotation aent, p.
) ; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895), 157 U. S., 429, 652
(per White, J., "rights and liberties") ; Mathews v. People (1903), 202 Ill.,
389, 401 (Magruder, C. J.: "It is now well settled that the privilege.of
contracting is both a liberty, and a property right.")..
For legislative use of the term in question, see the Copyright Act, 8
Anne (1709) c. 19 ("Shall have the sole right and liberty of printing each
book and books for the term of * * *").
Like the word "privilege" (see ante p. 38, n. 48), the term "liberty"
is occasionally used, especially in the older books, to indicate a franchise,
or complex of special rights, privileges, powers, or immunities. Thus in
Noy's Maxims (1641) there is this definition: "Liberty is a royal privilege
in the hands of a subject;" and, similarly, Blackstone (2 Com. 37) says:
"Franchise and liberty are used as synonymous terms; and their definition
is, a royal privilege, or branch of the king's prerogative, subsisting in the
hands of a subject."
This definition is quoted in S. F. Waterworks v. Schottler (1882), 62
Cal. 69, 106, and Central R. & Banking Co. v. State (1875), 54 Ga., 401,
409. Compare also Rex v. Halifax & Co. (1891), 2 Q. B., 263.
61 Compare Pond v. Bates, 34 L. J. (N. S.), 406 ("With full power
and free liberty to sink for, win and work the same, with all liberties,
privileges, etc., necessary and convenient," etc.); Hamilton v. Graham
(1871), L. R. 2 H. L. (Sc.), 166, 167; Attersoll v. Stevens (1808), 1 Taunt.,
183; Wickham v. Hawker (1840), 7 M. & W., 63, 78-79.
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they create. Accurately used, "license" is a generic term to indi-
cate a group of operative facts required to create a particular
privilege,-this being especially evident when the word is used in
the common phrase "leave and license." This point is brought
out by a passage from Mr. Justice Adams' opinion in Clifford v.
O'Neill:6?
"A license is merely a permission to do an act which, with-
out such permission, would amount to a trespass * * * nor will the
continuous enjoyment of the privilege conferred, for any period
of t:me cause it to ripen into a tangible interest in the land
affected." 63
Powers and Liabilities. As indicated in the preliminary scheme
of jural relations, a legal power (as distinguished, of course, from
a mental or physical power) is the opposite of legal disability, and
the correlative of legal liability. But what is the intrinsic nature
of a legal power as such? Is it possible to analyze the concep-
tion represented by this constantly employed and very important
term of legal discourse? Too close an analysis might seem
metaphysical rather than useful; so that what is here presented
is intended only as an approximate explanation sufficient for all
practical purposes.
A change in a given legal relation may result (1) from some
superadded fact or group of facts not under the volitional con-
trol of a human being (or human beings); or (2) from some
superadded fact or group of facts which are under the volitional
control of one or more human beings. As regards the second
class of cases, the person (or persons) whose volitional control is
paramount may be said to have the (legal) power to effect the
particular change of legal relations that is involved in the problem.
The second class of cases-powers in the technical sense-
62 (1896) 12 App. Div., 17; 42 N. Y. Sup., 607, 609.
63 See, in accord, the oft-quoted passage from Thomas v. Sorrell
(1673), Vaughan, 331, 351 ("A dispensation or license properly passes no
interest, nor alters or transfers property in anything, but only makes an
action lawful, which without it had been unlawful. As a license to go
beyond the seas, to hunt in a man's park, to come into his house, are
only actions, which without license, had been unlawful.").
Compare also Taylor v. Waters (1817), 7 Taunt., 374, 384 ("Those
cases abundantly prove that a license to enjoy a beneficial privilege in
land may be granted, and, notwithstanding the statue of frauds, without
writing." In this case the license (operative facts) is more or less
confused with privileges (the legal relation created); Heap v. Hartley
(1889), 42 Ch. D., 461, 470.
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must now be further considered. The nearest synonym for any
ordinary case seems to be (legal) "ability," 64-- the latter being
obviously the opposite of "inability," or "disability." The term
"right," so frequently and loosely used in the present connection,
is an unfortunate term for the purpose,-a not unusual result
being confusion of thought as well as ambiguity of expression."
The term "capacity" is equally unfortunate; for, as we have
already seen, when used with discrimination, this word denotes a
particular group of operative facts, and not a legal relation of
any kind.
Many examples of legal powers may readily be given. Thus,
X, the owner of ordinary personal property "in a tangible object"
has the power to extinguish his own legal interest (rights, powers,
immunities, etc.) through that totality of operative facts known
as abandonment; and-simultaneously and correlatively-to
create in other persons privileges and powers relating to the aban-
doned object,--e, g., the power -to acquire title to the later by
appropriating it.68 Similarly, X has the power to transfer his
interest to Y,-that is, to extinguish his own interest and con-
comitantly create in Y a new and corresponding interest.8 7  So
64 Compare Remington v. Parkins (1873), 10 R. I., 550, 553, per Durfee,
J.: "A power is an ability to do" .
65 See People v. Dikeman (1852), 7 Howard Pr., 124, 130; and Lonas
v. State '(1871), 3 Heisk. (Tenn.), 287 ,306-307, quoted ante, p.
See also Mabre v. Whittaker (1906), 10 Wash., 656, 663 (Washington
Laws of 1871 provided in relation to community property: "The husband
shall have the management of all the common property, but shall not have
the right to sell or encumber real estate except he shall be joined in the
sale or encumbrance by the wife. * * *" Per Scott, J.: "'Right' in the
sense used there means power").
Compare also St. Joseph Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hanck (1876),
63 Mo., 112. 118.
Numberless additional instances might be given of the use of the term
"right," where the legal quantity involved is really a power rather than a
right in the sense of claim.
6 It is to be noted that abandonment would leave X himself with pre-
cisely the same sort of privileges and powers as any other person.
67 Compare Wynehanter v. People (1856), 13 N. Y., 378, 396 (Coin-
stock, J.: "I can form no noticn of property which does not include the
essential characteristics and attributes with which it is clothed by the laws
of society * * * among which are, fundamentally the right of the occupant
or owner to use and enjoy (the objects) exclusively, and his absolute
power to sell and dispose of them") ; Bartemeyer v. Iowa (1873), 18 Wall.,
129, 137 (Field, J.: "The right of property in an article involves the power
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also X has the power to create contractual obligations of various
kinds. Agency cases are likewise instructive. By the use of
some metaphorical expression such as the Latin, qui facit per
allum, facit per se, the true nature of agency relations is only too
frequently obscured. The creation of an agency relation in-
volves, inter alia, the grant of legal powers to the so-called agent,
and the creation of correlative liabilities in the principal.
03 That
is to say, one party P has the power to create agency powers in
another party A,--for example, the power to convey X's prop-
erty, the power to impose (so-called) contractual obligations on
P, the power to discharge a debt, owing to P, the power to "re-
ceive" title to property so that it shall vest in P, and so forth.
In passing, it may be well to observe that thie term "authority," so
frequently used in agency cases, is very ambiguous and slippery
in its connotation. Properly employed in the present connection,
the word seems to be an abstract or qualitative term correspond-
ing to the concrete "authorization,"-the latter consisting of a
particular group of operative facts taking place between the prin-
cipal and the agent. All too often, however, the term in question
is so used as to blend and confuse these operative facts with the
to sell and dispose of such articles as well as to use and enjoy it") ; Low
v. Rees Printing Co. (1894), 41 Neb., 127, 146 (Ryan, C.: "Property, in
its broad sense, is not the physical thing which may be the subject of
ownership, but is the right of dominion, possession, and power of disposi-
tion which may be acquired over it.").
Since the power of alienation is frequently one of the fundamental
elements of a complex legal interest (or property aggregate), it is obvious
that a statute extinguishing such power may, in a given case be uncon-
stitutional as depriving the owner of property without due process of law.
See the cases just cited.
68 For a leading case exhibiting the nature of agency powers, es-
pecially powers "coupled with an interest," see Hunt v. Rousmanier
(1883), 8 Wheat., 173, 201.
It is interesting to note that in the German Civil Code the provisions
relating to agency are expressed in terms of powers,--e. g., sec. 168: "The
expiration of the power is determined by the legal relations upon which
the giving of the power is founded. The power is also revocable in the
event of the continuance of the legal relation, unless something different
results from the latter."
Incidentally, it may be noticed also, that as a matter of English usage,
the term "power of attorney" has, by association of ideas, come to be
used to designate the mere operative instrument creating the powers of
an agent.
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
powers and privileges thereby created in the agent.69 A careful
discrimination in these particulars would, it is submitted, go far
toward clearing up certain problems in the law of agency.70
Essentially similar to the powers of agents are powers of ap-
pointment in relation to property interests. So, too, the powers
of public officers are, intrinsically considered, comparable to those
of agents,-for example, the power of a sheriff to sell property
under a writ of execution. The power of a donor, in a gift
causa mortis, to revoke the gift and divest the title of the donee
is another clear example of the legal quantities now being con-
sidered ;71 also a pledgee's statutory power of sale.
7 2
There are, on the other hand, cases where the true nature of
the relations involved has not, perhaps, been so clearly recognized.
Thus, in the case of a conditional sale of personality, assuming
09 For examples of the loose and confusing employment of the term
"authority" in agency cases,--and that too, in problems of the conflict cf
laws requiring the closest reason,-see Pope v. Nickerson (1844), 3 Story,
465, 473, 476, 481, 483; Lloyd v Guibert (1865), 6 B. & S., 100, 117; King
v. Sarria (1877), 69 N. Y., 24, 28, 30-32; Risdon, etc., Works v. Furness
(1905), 1 K. B. 304; (1906) 1 K. B. 49.
For a criticism of these cases in relation to the present matter, see
the writer's article The Individual Liability of Stockholders and the Con-
flict of Laws (1909). 9 Columb. L. Rev., 492, 512, n. 46, 521, n. 71; 10
Columb. L. Rev., 542-544.
70 The clear understanding and recognition of the agency relation as
involving the creation of legal powers may be of crucial importance in
many cases,-especially, as already intimated, in regard to problems in the
conflict of laws. Besides the cases in the preceding note, two others may
be referred to, Milliken v. Pratt (1878), 125 Mass., 374, presenting no
analysis of the agency problem; and, on the other hand, Freeman's Appeal
(1897), 68 Conn., 533, involving a careful analysis of the agency relation
by Baldwin, J. Led by this analysis to reach a decision essentially oppo-
site to that of the Massachusetts case, the learned judge said, inter alia :
"Such was, in effect, the act by which Mrs. Mitchell undertook to do
what she had no legal capacity to do, by making her' husband her agent to
deliver the guaranty to the bank. He had no more power to make it
operative by delivery in Chicago to one of his creditors in Illinois, than he
would have had to make it operative by delivery here, had it been drawn
in favor of one of his creditors in Connecticut. It is not the place of
delivery that controls, but the power of delivery."
71 See Emery v. Clough (1885), 63 N. H., 552 ("right or power of
defeasance").
72 See Hudgens v. Chamberlain (1911), 161 Cal., 710, 713, 715. For
another instance of statutory powers, see Capital, etc., Bk. v. Rhodes
(1903), 1 Ch. 631, 655 (powers under registry acts.).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the vendee's agreement has been fully performed except as to the
payment of the last installment and the time for the latter has
arrived, what is the interest of such vendee as regards the prop-
erty? Has he, as so often assumed, merely a contractual right
to have title passed to him by consent of the vendor, on final
payment being made; or has he, irrespective of the consent of the
vendor the power to divest the title of the latter and to acquire
a perfect title for himself ? Though the language of the cases is
not always so clear as it might be, the vendee seems to have pre-
cisely that sort of power.73 Fundamentally considered, the typical
escrow transaction in which the performance of conditions is
within the volitional control of the grantee, is somewhat similar
to the conditional sale of personalty; and, when reduced to its
lowest terms, the problem seems easily to be solved in terms of
legal powers. Once the "escrow" is formed, the grantor still
has the legal title; but the grantee has an irrevocable power to
divest that title by performance of certain conditions (i. e., the
addition of various operative facts), and conconiitantly to vest
title in himself. While such power is outstanding, the grantor is,
73 Though the nebulous term "rights" is used by the courts, it is evi-
dent that powers are the actual quantities involved.
Thus, in the instructive case of Carpenter v. Scott (1881), 13 R. I.,
477, 479, the court said, by Matteson, J.: "Under it (the conditional sale)
the vendee acquires not only the right of possession and use, but the right
to become the absolute owner upon complying with the terms of the con-
tract. These are rights of which no act of the vendor can divest him,
and which, in the absence of any stipulation in the contract restraining
him, he can transfer by sale or mortgage. Upon performance of the
conditions of the sale, the title to the property vests in the vendee, or in
the event that he has sold, or mortgaged it, in his vendee, or mortgagee,
without further bill of sale. * * * These rights constitute an actual, present
interest in the property, which, as we have seen above, ig capable of trans-
fer by sale or mortgage."
It is interesting to notice that in the foregoing passage, the term
"right" is first used to indicate privileges of possession and use; next the
term is employed primarily in the sense of legal power, thcugh possibly
there is a partial blending of this idea with that of legal claim, or right
(in the narrowest connotation) ; then the term (in plural form) is used
for the third time so as to lump together the vendee's privileges, powers
and claims.
For another case indicating in substance the true nature of the yen-
dee's interest, see Christensen v. Nelson (1901), 38 Or. 473. 477, 479, in-
dicating, in effect, that the vendee's powers as well as privileges may be
transferred to another, and that a proper tender constitutes "the equiva-
len of payment."
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of course, subject to a correlative liability to have his title di-
vested.74 Similarly, in the case of a conveyance of land in fee
simple subject to condition subsequent, after the condition has
been performed, the original grantor is commonly said to have a
"right of entry." If, however, the problem is analyzed, it will be
seen that, as of primary importance, the grantor has two legal
quantities, (1) the privilege of entering, and (2) the power, by
means of such entry, to divest the estate of the grantee.5 The
latter's estate endures, subject to the correlative liability of being
divested, until such power is actually exercised.
78
Passing now to the field of contracts, suppose A mails a letter
to B offering to sell the former's land, Whiteacre, to the latter
for ten thousand dollars, such letter being duly received. The
operative facts thus far mentioned have created a power as re-
gards B and a correlative liability as regards A. B, by dropping
a letter of acceptance in the box, has the power to impose poten-
tial or inchoate77 obligation ex contractu on A and himself; and,
assuming that the land is worth fifteen thousand dollars, that par-
ticular legal quantity-the "power plus liability" relation between
A and B-seems to be worth about five thousnad dollars to B.
The liability of A will continue for a reasonable time unless, in
exercise of his power to do so, A previously extinguishes it by
that series of operative facts known as "revocation." These last
matters are usually described by saying that A's "offer" will "con-
74 See Davis v. Clark (1897), 58 Kan. 100; 48 Pac., 563. 565; Loiter v.
Pike (1889), 127 Ill., 287, 326; Welstur V. Trust Co. (1895.), 145 N. Y.,
275, 283; Furley v. Palmer (1870), 20 Oh. St., 223, 225.
The proposition that the grantee's power is irrevocable is subject to
the qualification that it might possibly be extinguished (or modified pro
tanto) as the result of a transaction between the grantor and one having
the position of bona fide purchaser, or the equivalent.
It is hardly necessary to add that the courts, instead of analyzing the
problem of the escrow in terms of powers, as here indicated, are accus-
tomed to stating the question and deciding it in terms of "delivery," "re-
lation back," "performance of conditions," etc.
75 In this connection it is worthy of note that Sugden, in his work on
Powers (8th ed., 1861) 4, uses, contrary to general practice, the ex-
pression, "power of entry for condition broken."
76 For miscellaneous instances of powers, see the good opinions in.
Bk. of S. Australia v. Abrahams, L. R. P. C., 265; Barlow v. Ross (1890),.
24 Q. B. D., 381, 384.
77 As to "inchoate" obligations, see Frost v. Knight (1872) L. R. 7 Ex.
111, per Cockburn, C. J. This matter will receive further attention in a.
later part of the discussion.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
tinue" or "remain open" for a reasonable time, or for the definite
time actually specified, unless A previously "withdraws" or "re-
vokes" such offer.78  While no doubt, in the great majority of
cases no harm results from the use of such expressions, yet these
forms of statement seem to represent a blending of non-legal and
legal quantities which, in any problem requiring careful reason-
ing, should preferably be kept distinct. An offer, considered as
a series of physical and mental operative facts, has spent its force
as soon as such series has been completed by the "offeree's re-
ceipt." The real question is therefore as to the legal effect, if
any, at that moment of time. If the latter consist of B's power
and A's correlative liability, manifestly it is those legal relations
that "continue" or "remain open" until modified by revocation or
other operative facts. What has thus far been said concerning
contracts completed by mail would seem to apply, mutatis -nutan-
dis, to every type of contract. Even where the parties are in the
presence of each other, the offer creates a liability against the
offerer, together with a correlative power in favor of the offeree.
The only distinction for present purposes would be in the fact
that such power and such liability would expire within a very
short period of time.
Perhaps the practical justification for this method of analysis
is somewhat greater in relation to the subject of options. In his
able work on -Contacts," Langdell says:
"If the offerer stipulates that his offer shall remain open for a
specified time, the first question is whether such stipulation con-
stitutes a binding contract. * ** When such a stipulation is bind-
ing, the further question arises, whether it makes the offer irre-
vocable. It has been a common opinion that it does, but that is
clearly a mistake. * * * An offer is merely one of the elements of
a contract; and it is indispensable to the making of a contract
that the wills of the contracting parties do, in legal contemplation,
concur at the moment of making it. An offer, therefore, which
the party making it has no power to revoke, is a legal impos-
78 Compare Boston R. Co. v. Bartlett (1849), 3 Cush., 225: "Though
the writing signed by the defendant was but an offer, and an offer which
might be revoked, yet while it remained in force and unrevoked, it was a
continuing offer, during the time limited for acceptance, and during the
whole of the rest of the time it was an offer every instant; but as soon
as it was accepted, it ceased to be an offer merely.
Compare also the forms of statement in Ashley, Contr. (1911), 16
et. seq.
79 Langdell, Sum. Contr. (2nd ed., 1880), sec. 178.
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sibility. Moreover, if the stipulation should make the offer irre-
vocable, it would be a contract incapable of being broken; which
is also a legal impossibility. The only effect, therefore, of such
a stipulation is to give the offeree a claim for damages if the
stipulation be broken by revoking the offer."80
The foregoing reasoning ignores the fact that an ordinary offer
ipso facto creates a legal relation-a legal power and a legal lia-
bility,-and that it is this relation (rather than the physical and
mental facts constituting the offer) that "remains open." If
these points be conceded, there seems no difficulty in recognizing
an unilateral option agreement supported by consideration or
embodied in a sealed instrument as creating in the optionee an
irrevocable power to create, at any time within the period speci-
fled, a bilateral obligation as between himself and the giver of
the option. Correlatively to that power, there would, of course,
be a liability against the option-giver which he himself would have
no power to extinguish. The courts seem to have no difficulty
in reaching precisely this result as a matter of substance; though
their explanations are always in terms of "withdrawal of offer,"
and similar expressions savoring of physical and mental quan-
tities.,,
In connection with the powers and liabilities created respec-
tively by an ordinary offer and by an option, it is interesting to
consider the liabilities of a person engaged in a "public calling;"
for, as it seems, such a party's characteristic position is, one might
almost say, intermediate between that of an ordinary contractual
80 Langdell's a priori premises and specific conclusions have been
adopted by a number of other writers on the subject. See, for example,
Ashley, Contr. (1911), 25 et seq., R. L. McWilliams, Enforcement of
Option Agreements (1913), 1 Calif. Law Rev., 122.
81 For a recent judicial expression on the subject, see W. G. Reese Co.
vs. House (1912), 162 Cal., 740, 745 per Sloss J.: "Where there is a con-
sideration, othe option cannot be withdrawn during the time agreed upon
for its duration, while, if there be no consideration the party who has
given the option may revoke it at any time before acceptance, even though
the time limited has not expired * * * such offer, duly accepted, constitutes
a contract binding upon both parties and enforceable by either."
See, to the same effect, Linn v. McLean (1885), 80 Ala., 360, 364;
O'Brien v. Boland (1896), 166 Mass., 481, 483 (sealed offer).
Most of the cases recognizing the irrevocable power of the optionee
have arisen in equitable suits for specific performance; but there seems
to be no reason for doubting that the same doctrine should be applied in
a dommon law action for damages. See, in accord, Baker v. Shaw (1912),
68 Wash., 99 103 (dicta in an action for damages).
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offerer and that of an option-giver. It has indeed been usual to
assert that such a party is (generally speaking) under a present
'duty to all other parties; but this is believed to be erroneous.
Thus, Professor Wyman, in his work on Public Service Com-
panies," says:
"The duty placed upon every one exercising a public calling is
primarily a duty to serve every man who is a member of the
pub ic. * * * It is somewhat difficult to place this exceptional duty
in our legal system. * * * The truth of the matter is that the obli-
gati-n resting up.n one who has undertaken the performance of
public duty is sui generis."88
It is submitted that the learned writer's difficulties arise pri-
marily from a failure to see that the innkeeper, the common car-
rier and others similarly "holding out" are under present liabili-
ties rather than present duties. Correlativly to those liabilities are
the respective powers of the various members of the public.
Thus, for example, a travelling member of the public has the
legal power, by making proper application and sufficient tender,
to impose a duty on the innkeeper to receive him as a guest. For
breach of the duty thus created an action would of course lie. It
would therefore seem that the innkeeper is, to some extent, like
one who had given an option to every travelling member of the
public. He differs, as regards net legal effect, only because he
can extinguish his present liabilities and the correlative powers
of the travelling members of the public by going out of business.
Yet, on the other hand, his liabilities are more onerous than that
of an ordinary contractual offerer, for be cannot extinguish his
liabilities by any simple performance akin to revocation of offer.
As regards all the "legal powers" thus far considered, possibly
some caution is necessary. If, for example, we consider the
ordinary property owner's power of alienation, it is necessary to
distinguish carefully between the legal power, the physical power
to do the things necessary for the "exercise" of the legal power,
and, finally, the privilege of doing these things-that is, if such
privilege does really exist. It may or may not. Thus, if X, a
landowner, has contracted with Y that the former will not
alienate to Z, the acts of X necessary to exercise the power of
alienating to Z are privileged as between X and every party other
than Y; but, obviously, as between X and Y, the former has ne
82 Secs. 330-333.
82 Compare, to the same effect, Keener, Quasi-Contr. (1893), p. 18.
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privilege of doing the necessary acts; or conversely, he is under
a duty to Y not to do what is necessary to exercise the power.
In view of what has already been said, very little may suffice
concerning a liability as such. The latter, as we have seen, is
the correlative of power, and the opposite of immunity (or
exemption). While no doubt the term "liability" is often loosely
used as a synonym for "duty," or "obligation," it is believed, from
an extensive survey of judicial precedents, that the connotation
already adopted as most appropriate to the word in question is
fully justified. A few cases tending to indicate this will now be
noticed. In McNeer v. McNeer,14 Mr. Justice Magruder bal-
anced the conceptions of power and liability as follows:
"So long as she lived, however, his interest in her land lacked
those elements of property, such as power of disposition and lia-
bility to sale on execution which had formerly given it the char-
acter of a vested estate."
In Booth v. Commonwealth,85 the court had to construe a Vir-
ginia statute providing "that all free white male persons who are
twenty-one years of age and not over sixty, shall be liable to serve
as jurors, except as hereinafter provided." It is plain that this
enactment imposed only a liability and not a duty. It is a liability
to have a duty created. The latter would arise only when, in
exercise of their powers, the parties litigant and the court officers,
had done what was necessary to impose a specific duty to perform
the functions of a juror. The language of the court, by
Moncure, J., is particularly apposite as indicating that liability is
the opposite, or negative, of immunity (or exemption) :
"The word both expressed and implied is 'liable,' which has a
very different meaning from 'qualified * * *. It's meaning is
'bound' or 'obliged' * * *. A person exempt from serving on
juries is not liable to serve, and a person not liable to serve is
exempt from serving. The terms seem to be convertible."
A further good example of judicial usage is to be found in
Emery v. Clough.8 Referring to a gift causa mortis and the
donee's liability to have his already vested interest divested by the
donor's exercise of his power of revocation, Mr. Justice Smith
said:
"The title to the gift causa mortis passed by the delivery, de-
feasible only in the lifetime of the donor, and his death perfects
84 (1892) 142 Ill., 388, 397.
85 1861) 16 Grat., 519, 525.
so (1885) 63 N. H., 552.
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the title in the donee by terminating the donor's right or power
of defeasance. The property passes from the donor to the donee
directly * * * and after his death it is liable to be divested only
in favor of the donor's creditors. * ** His right and power ceased
with his death."
Perhaps the nearest synonym of "liability" is "subjection" or
"responsibility." As regards the latter word, a passage from Mr.
Justice Day's opinion in McElfresh v. Kirkendall 7 is interesting:
"The words 'debt' and 'liability' are.not synonymous, and they
are not commonly so understood. As applied to the pecuniary
relations of the parties, liability is a term of broader significance
than debt. * * * Liability is responsibility."
While the term in question has the broad generic connotation
already indicated, no doubt it very frequently indicates that specific
form of liability (or complex of liabilities) that is correlative to
a power (or complex of powers) 8 vested in a party litigant and
the various court officers. Such was held to be the meaning of
a certain California statute involved in the case of Lattin v. Gil-
lette8 9 Said Mr. Justice Harrison:
"The word 'liability' is the condition in which an individual is
placed after a breach of his contract, or a violation of any obliga-
tion resting upon him. It is defined by Bouvier to be responsi-
bility."' 0
87 (1873) 36 Ia., 224, 226.
88 Compare Attorney General v. Sudeley (1896), 1 Q. B., 354, 359 (per
Lord Esher: "What is called a 'right of action' is not the power of bring-
ing an action. Anybody can bring an action though he has no right at
all."); Kroessin v. Keller (1895), 60 Minn., 372 (per Collins, J.: "The
power to bring such actions").
89 (1892) 95 Cal., 317, 319.
90 We are apt to think of liability as exclusively an onerous relation
of one party to another. But, in its broad technical significance, this is
not necessarily so. Thus X, the owner of a watch, has the power to
abandon his property-that is, to extinguish his existing rights, powers,
and immunities relating thereto (not, however, his privileges, for until
someone else has acquired title to the abandoned watch, X would have the
same privileges as before) ; and correlatively to X's power of abandon-
ment there is a liability in every other person. But such a liability
instead of being onerous or unwelcome, is quite the opposite. As regards
another person M, for example, it is a liability to have created in his
favor (though against his will) a privilege and a power relating to the
watch,-that is, the privilege of taking possession and the power, by doing
so, to vest a title in himself. See Dougherty v. Creary (1866), 30 Cal., 290,
298. Contrast with this agreeable form of liability the liability to have
a duty created-for example the liability of one who has made or given an
option in a case where the value of the property has greatly risen.
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Immunities and Disabilities. As already brought out, immunity
is the correlative of disability ("no-power"), and the opposite,
or negation, of liability. Perhaps it will also be plain, from the
preliminary outline and from the discussion down to this point,
that a power bears the same general contrast to an immunity that
a right does to a privilege. A right is one's affirmative claim
against another, and a privilege is one's freedom from the right or
claim of another. Similarly, a power is one's affirmative "con-
trol" over a given legal relation as against another; whereas an
immunity is one's freedom from the legal power or "control" of
another as regards some legal relation.
A few examples may serve to make this clear. X, a land-
owner, has, as we have seen, power to alienate to Y or to any
other ordinary party. On the other hand, X has also various
immunities as against Y, and all other ordinary parties. For Y
is under a disability (i. e., has no power) so far as shifting the
legal interest either to himself or to a third party is concerned;
and what is true of Y applies similarly to every one else who has
not by virtue of special operative facts acquired a power to alien-
ate X's property. If, indeed, a sheriff has been duly empowered
by a writ of execution to sell X's interest, that is a very different
matter: correlative to such sheriff's power would be the liability
of X,-the very opposite of immunity (or exemption). It is
elementary, too, that as against the sheriff, X might be immune or
exempt in relation to certain parcels of property, and be liable
as to others. Similarly, if an agent has been duly appointed by
X to sell a given piece of property, then, as to the latter, X has,
in relation to such agent, a liability rather than an immunity.
For over a century there has been, in this country, a great deal
of important litigation involving immunities from powers of taxa-
tion. If there be any lingering misgivings as to the "practical"
importance of accuracy and discrimination in legal conceptions
and legal terms, perhaps some of such doubts would be dispelled
by considering the numerous cases on valuable taxation exemp-
tions coming before the United States Supreme Court. Thus, in
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Tennessee,9 ' Mr. Justice Peckham expressed
the views of the court as follows:
"In granting to the De Sota Company 'all the rights, privileges,
and immunities' of the Bluff City Company, all words are used
which could be regarded as necessary to carry the exemption from
01 (1895) 161 U. S., 174, 177.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
taxation possessed by the Bluff City Company; while in the next
following grant, that of the charter of the plaintiff in error, the
word 'immunity' is omitted. Is there any meaning to be attached
to that omission, and if so, what? We think some meaning is to
be attached to it. The word 'immunity' expresses more clearly
and definitely an intention to include therein an exemption from
taxation than does either of the other words. Exemption from
taxation is more accurately described as an 'immunity' than as a
privilege, although it is not to be denied that the latter word may
sometimes and under some circumstances include such exemp-
tions.'?
In Morgan v. Louisiana,9 2 there is an instructive discussion
from the pen of Mr. Justice Field. In holding that on a fore-
closure sale of the franchise and property of a railroad corpora-
tion an immunity from taxation did not pass to the purchaser, the
learned Judge said:
"As has been often said by this court, the whole community is
interested in retaining the power of taxation undiminished * * *
The exemption of the property of the company from taxation,
and the exemption of its officers and servants from jury and mili-
tary duty, were both intended for the benefit of the company, and
its benefit alone. In their personal character they are analogous
to exemptions from execution of certain property of debtors,
made by laws of several of the states.
9 3
92 (1876) 93 U. S., 217, 222.
93 See, in accord, Picard v. Tennessee, etc., R. Co. (1888), 130 U. S.,
637, 642, (Field, J.) ; Rochester Railway Co. v. Rochester (1906) 205 U. S.,
236, 252 (Moody, J., reviewing the many other cases on the subject).
In Internat. & G. N. Ry. Co. v. State (1899), 75 Tex., 356, a different
view was taken as to the alienability of an immunity from taxation.
Speaking by Stayton, C. J., the court said:
"Looking at the provisions of the Act of March 10, 1875, we think
there can be no doubt the exemption from taxation given by it, instead of
being a right vesting only in appellant, is a right which inheres in the
property to which it applies, and follows it into the hands of whosover
becomes the owner. * * * The existence of this right enharces the value
of the property to which it applies. Shareholders and creditors must be
presumed to have dealt with the corporation on the faith of the contract
which gave the exemption, and it cannot be taken away by legislation, by
dissolution of the corporation, or in any other manner not sufficient to
pass title to any other property from one person to another. The right
to exemption from taxation is secured by the same guaranty which secures
titles to those owning lands granted under the act, and though the corpora-
tion may be dissolved, will continue to exist in favor of persons owning
the property to which the immunity applies. Lawful dissolution of a
corporation will destroy all its corporate franchises or privileges vested by
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So far as immunities are concerned ,the two judicial discussions
last quoted concern- respectively problems of interpretation and
problems of alienability. In many other cases difficult constitu-
tional questions have arisen as the result of statutes impairing
or extending various kinds of immunities. Litigants have, from
time to time, had occasion to appeal both to the clause against
impairment of the obligation of contracts and to the provision
against depriving a person of property without due process of
law. This has been especially true as regards exemptions from
taxation9 4 and exemptions from execution. 5
If a word may now be permitted with respect to mere terms as
such, the first thing to note is that the word "right" is over-
worked in the field of immunities as elsewhere. 96 As indicated,
however, by the judicial expressions already quoted, the best
synonym is, of course, the term "exemption. 91 7  It is instructive
legislature not to grant the benefit claimed by the bill."
the act of incorporation; but if it holds rights, privileges, and franchises
in the nature of property, secured by contract based on valuable considera-
tion, these will survive the dissolution of the corporation, for the benefit of
those who may have a right to or just claim upon its assets."
Compare, as regard homestead exemptions, Sloss, J., in Smith v.
Bougham (1909), 156 Cal., 359, 365: "A declaration of homestead ** *
attaches certain privileges and immunities to such title as may at the time
be held."
94 See Choate v. Trapp (1912), 224 U. S., 665.
a See Brearly School, Linited v. Ward (1911), 201 N. Y., 358; 94
N. E., 1001 (an interesting decision, with three judges dissenting). The
other cases on the subject are collected in Ann. Cas., 1912 B, 259.
06 See Brearly School, Limited v. Ward, cited in preceding note; also
Internat. & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Stale (1899), 75 Tex., 356, quoted from,
ante, n. 91.
9 Compare also Wilson v. Gaines (1877), 9 Baxt. (Tenn.), 546, 550-
551, Turney. J.: "The use in the statutes of two only of the words of the
constitution, i. e., 'rights' and 'privileges,' and the omission to employ either
of the other two following in immediate succession, viz.,' immunities' and
'exemptions,' either of which would have made clear the construction
claimed by complainant, evidence a purposed intention on the part of the
Only very rarely is a court found seeking to draw a subtle distinction
between an immunity and an exemption. Thus, in a recent case, Strahan
v'. Wayne Co. (June, 1913), 142 N. W., 678, 680 (Neb.), Mr. Justice
Barnes said: "It has been held by the great weight of authority that
dower is not immune (from the inheritance tax) because it is dower, but
because it * * * belonged to her unchoately during (the husband's) life.
* * * Strictly speaking, the widow's share -should be considered as immune,
rather than exempt, from an inheritance tax. It is free, rather than
freed, from such tax."
YALE LAW JOURNAL
to note, also, that the word "impunity" has a very similar conno-
tation. This is made evident by the interesting discriminations
of Lord Chancellor Finch in Skelton v. Skelton,
8 a case decided
in 1677:
"But this I would by no means allow, that equity should en-
large the restraints of the disabilities introduced by act of parlia-
ment; and as to the granting of injunctions to stay waste, I took
a distinction xhere the tenant hath only impunitatem, and where
he hath jus in arboribus. If the tenant have only a bare indemnity
or exemption from an action (at law), if he committed waste,
there it is fit he should be restrained by injunction from com-
mitting it.""9
In the latter part of the preceding discussion, eight conceptions
of the law have been analyzed and compared in some detail, the
purpose having been to exhibit not only their intrinsic meaning
and scope, but also their relations to one another and the methods
by which they are applied, in judicial reasoning, to the solution of
concrete problems of litigation. Before concluding this branch
of the discussion a general suggestion may be ventured as to the
great practical importance of a clear appreciation of the dis-
tinctions and discriminations set forth. If a homely metaphor be
permitted, these eight conceptions,--rights and duties, privileges
and no-rights, powers and liabilities, immunities and disabilities,-
seem to be what may be called "the lowest common denominators
of the law." Ten fractions (1-3, 2-5, etc.) may, superficially,
seem so different from one another as to defy comparison. If,
however, they are expressed in terms of their lowest common
denominators (5-15, 6-15, etc.), comparison becomes easy, and
fundamental similarity may be discovered. The same thing is
98 (1677) 2 Swanst., 170.
09 In Skelton v. Skelton, it will be observed, the word "impunity" and
the word "exemption" are used as the opposite of liability to the powers
of a plaintiff in an action at law.
For similar recent instances, see Vacher & Sons, Limited v. London
Society of Compositors (1913), A. C. 107, 118, 125 (per Lord Macnagh-
ten: "Now there is nothing absurd in the notion of an association or body
enjoying immunity from actions at law ;" per Lord Atkinson: "Conferring
on the trustees immunity as absolute," etc.).
Compare also Baylies v. Bishop of London (1913), 1 Ch., 127, 139, 140,
per Hamilton, L. J.
For instances of the apt use of the term "disability" as equivalent
to the negation of legal power, see Poury v. Hordern (1900), 1 Ch., 492,
495; Sheridan v. Elden (1862), 24 N. Y., 281, 384.
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of course true as regards the lowest generic conceptions to which
any and all "legal quantities" may be reduced.
Reverting, for example, to the subject powers, it might be dif-
ficult at first glance to discover any essential and fundamental
similarity between conditional sales of personalty, escrow trans-
actions, option agreements, agency relations, powers of appoint-
ment, etc. But if all these relations are reduced to their lowest
generic terms, the conceptions of legal power and legal liability
are seen to be dominantly, though not exclusively, applicable
throughout the series. By such a process it becomes possible not
only to discover essential similarities and illuminating analogies
in the midst of what appears superficially to be infinite and hope-
less variety, but also to discern common principles of justice and
policy underlying the various jural problems involved. An in-
direct, yet very practidal, consequence is that it frequently be-
comes feasible, by virtue of such analysis, to use as persuasive
authorities judicial precedents that might otherwise seem alto-
gether irrelevant. If this point be valid with respect to powers,
it would seem to be equally so as regards all of the other basic
conceptions of the law. In short, the deeper the analysis, the




100The next article in the present series will discuss the distinctions
between legal and equitable jural relations; also the contrast between
rights, etc., in rem, and rights, etc., in personam. The supposed distirc-
tions betwen substantive and adjective jural relations will also be con-
sidered,--chiefly with the purpose of showing that, so far as the intrinsic
and essential nature of those relations is concerned, the distinctions com-
monly assumed to exist are imaginary rather than real. Finally, some
attention will be given to the nature and analysis of complex legal inter-
ests, or aggregates of jural relations.
